Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking by Monheim-Helstroffer, Jenny & Obidzinski, Marie
Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking
Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer, Marie Obidzinski
To cite this version:
Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer, Marie Obidzinski. Optimal discretion in asylum lawmak-
ing. International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2010, 30 (1), pp.86-97.
<10.1016/j.irle.2009.09.004>. <hal-00447157>
HAL Id: hal-00447157
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00447157
Submitted on 14 Jan 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking∗
Jenny Monheim Helstroffer†, Marie Obidzinski‡
Revised, August 2009
Abstract
This paper uses a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee
law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host
countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict
measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized “race to the bottom” of
asylum law.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to establish whether refugee law should be centralized, how it should
be centralized, and what are the consequences for migrants seeking protection as well as for
host countries in different geographical situations. Let us begin with some facts about refugee
flows and refugee laws.1
The discussion about asylum concerns important contemporary questions on human
rights, international migration and development. The right to asylum is the object of art. 14
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2. There has been a long term rise and variabil-
ity in the number of asylum seekers, as well as a skewed distribution of asylum applications
in host countries: for example, at the end of 2008, Europe hosted 12% (4.1 million) of the
world-wide population of refugees3, and the US hosted 0.35 million, or 1% (UNHCR 2009).
Also, the number of asylum applications in the EU was multiplied by 7.3 between 1982 and
1992, when they peaked. The Dublin II Regulation stipulates that a refugee without a visa
must apply for asylum in the first country entered on the EU territory.4 This puts extensive
pressure on border areas.5
Simultaneously, asylum legislation has been made less welcoming in all western countries.
There has been much debate within and between countries as to which asylum laws should
be adopted and who should decide on them6.
In the US, refugee law is made at the federal level. In the European Union, it is in
the process of being moved from the national to the EU level7. It was integrated into the
European Union as part of the third, intergovernmental pillar, and is being moved to the
1We do not distinguish between “true” refugees and economic migrants. Rather, we apply a continuum
of types (see model). We use “refugee” as a generic term for all migrants seeking protection.
2United Nations 1948.
3United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR 2009, including among other categories recognized refugees,
asylum claimants and people in refugee-like situations.
4Art. 10, Council of the European Union 2003.
5See for example http://www.ecre.org/topics/dublin ii.
6See for example dpa (2006), European Parliament (2005), Zimmermann and Tumlin (1999).
7See European Commission 2007.
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first, supranational pillar. A Common European Asylum system (CEAS) is in the process
of being drafted to establish a common asylum procedure and uniform status valid in all
EU countries.8 Common minimum standards have already been agreed on. The EU has a
subsidiarity principle, which requires that a centralized production of law should be preferred
only when the law cannot be efficiently provided by Member States.9 In this paper, we
examine the efficiency of asylum law making regimes with different degrees of harmonization
from the point of view of the countries, in the light of the subsidiarity principle, as well as
from the human rights perspective.
The empirical literature on refugee destination country choices shows that toughening
asylum laws of a country (i) negatively impacts on asylum applications, and (ii) that they
have a positive effect on the number of applications in the other countries of the zone. Hatton
(2004) finds an important reduction in asylum applications in the countries which toughened
their asylum laws. Rotte et al. (1996) show that the reforms of the German asylum law in
1987 and 1993 led to a considerable fall in the number of applications in Germany, and to
an increase in France. Zetter et al. (2003) find a correlation between the reduction in the
generosity of asylum measures and asylum applications in Germany, Sweden and France, but
not in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. Importantly, there are influences on the choice
of destination country for refugees other than asylum law, such as the presence of family or
cultural ties. Bo¨cker and Havinga (1997) estimate that the size of the impact of the level of
the asylum legislation on the choice of destination country depends on other characteristics
of the country. Cox and Posner (2009), in their theory of the rights of migrants, discuss the
interests of states in providing rights for migrants. They show that states incur both costs
and benefits from migration.
The implications of an externality of legal rules on other countries is discussed in the
literature under the heading of regulatory competition.10 In 1956, Tiebout suggested a
model in which governments compete to attract citizens through lawmaking. According to
8See European Commission 2007.
9Art. 5, Treaty Establishing the European Community.
10See for example Esty and Gerardin (2000) for a survey on the regulatory competition literature.
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the literature, the externality effect limits the benefits of competition and induces a “race to
the bottom” rationale (or “Delaware effect”11).
The regulatory competition idea is mainly applied to taxes (Mintz and Tulkens 1986,
Wildasin 1988, Kanbur and Keen 1993). Another area largely examined is competition on
the level of environmental regulation (Oates and Schwab 1988, Markusen, Morey and Olewiler
1993, Revesz 1992, 1996 and 2000).
Barbou des Places and Deffains (2004) identify a race to the bottom in asylum policy
making in Europe due to regulatory competition. They suggest collective action at a central-
ized level to escape harmful competition in asylum law making. Bubb, Kremer and Levine
(2008) model regulatory competition of refugee protection between states in the presence of
a screening problem. They point out the existence of a “race to the bottom” of asylum.
The authors address burden sharing schemes, but not the impact of minimum standards and
harmonization, which are the focus of this paper.
If harmonization is the optimal solution to avoid externalities and therefore a “race to
the bottom”, it is applied at some cost12. The law and economics literature has shown that
with heterogeneous countries, harmonization creates inefficencies (Faure 1998, Ogus 1999,
Van den Bergh 2000). Esty and Geradin (2000) and Van den Bergh (2000) also argue that,
in order to have optimal governance, a flexible mix between cooperation and competition
should be considered. Deakin (1999) notes that competition between countries may lead to
a greater convergence of standards than “reflexive harmonization”. The latter consists in
a “dynamic regulatory competition” which, according to the author, would maintain some
diversity while allowing innovation in the pool of legal solutions at the federal level.
Feasible political solutions to the problem of competition between countries in the context
of the coordination of taxation are discussed by Peralta and van Ypersele (2006). Minimum
11See among others Barnard (2000).
12The conditions under which centralized versus decentralized educational standards raise welfare are
examined in Costrell (1997). In the domain of environmental regulation, see Markusen, Morey and Olewiler
(1993), Oates (1998) and Van Egteren, Smith and Mc Afee (2004). On fiscal harmonization, see among
others Oates (1999). On competition policy, see Easterbrook (1993).
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standards are found by Kanbur and Keen (1993) to be a favorable alternative to full cen-
tralization. They discuss the consequences on taxation of the heterogeneity in the size of
countries using spatial models.
In our model, we assume that countries face heterogeneity in refugee flows. The optimal
choices regarding the relative generosity of refugee law differ between the countries. This
results in a variation in the criteria for eligibility to the refugee status, which can also be
interpreted as the standard of proof. In a zone composed of at least two countries, or
jurisdictions, this difference in asylum laws involves an externality, because a tightening of
the eligibility standard in one country induces a number of refugees to apply for asylum in
the other country. Therefore, the latter’s hosting costs are increased. We show that this
positive externality leads to a race to the bottom, i.e. to a toughening of asylum laws, or
an increase in the standard of proof. The harmonization of asylum law at a central level
“internalizes” the externality; however, it involves costs in terms of inefficiency because the
member countries can no longer optimize their policies.
The Kaldor-Hicks decision rule is applied to the choice of the asylum law making regime:
the benefit of the state that profits from the rule must outweigh the loss of the other state. In
this light, we discuss the redistributionary effects of moving the asylum law making process
to the supranational level. Two forms of harmonization are compared: fixed and minimum
asylum laws. We choose to evaluate the implications of different law making mechanisms
from the point of view of the member countries and of refugees. We find that the subsidiarity
principle is not necessarily respected in the harmonization of asylum law, while a system of
minimum standards is clearly best for refugees and the best harmonization model for host
countries.
The next section introduces the model. Harmonization is discussed in section 3. The
results are discussed, simulated and applied to the European context in section 4.
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2 The model
2.1 Legal standard and refugee type
Assume there are two jurisdictions in the same geographical area, indexed by i  {1, 2}.
Each jurisdiction is interested in setting the refugee eligibility standard xi that will balance
the benefits against the costs of hosting refugees. This standard corresponds to the level of
gravity of a refugee’s personal situation that is required to be granted a protection status
(asylum)13. In contrast with the usual use of the term “standard” in the law and economics
literature, a low standard here corresponds to a high standard of proof, i.e. low generosity
towards refugees. A high standard is more lenient in its eligibility criteria. This at first view
counter-intuitive definition of the standard is chosen in order to reflect the view of a “race
to the bottom”: the lower the standard, the less generous it becomes.
The situation of each refugee is characterized by a certain level of gravity14 that defines
his type x. For simplicity, we assume that the population of refugees is uniformly distributed
along [0, 1]. The gravity of the individual cases is common knowledge; it is observed by the
state in the course of hearings that are part of the asylum procedure. The refugee knows
the standard xi of each jurisdiction and knows whether he is eligible or not in jurisdiction i,
i.e. whether x 6 xi. The higher the standard, the more refugees are eligible to the refugee
status. Those who do not fulfil the criteria of the highest standard are categorized as illegal
immigrants.
Let the exogenous parameter α be the proportion of refugees who opt for jurisdiction 1 if
the standard of the two countries is the same. In other words, α characterizes the preference
of refugees for jurisdiction 1, with α < 1
2
, i.e. jurisdiction 2 is the preferred destination.
All the factors that determine the preference α for country 1 as compared to country 2 are
13Asylum or a different protection status is granted when the gravity of the case is judged sufficiently high
to fulfill the eligibility criteria required by the standard. For our purposes it is not necessary to differentiate
between the statuses.
14The eligibility of the refugee is defined by the gravity of his individual need for protection, determined
by his personal history of political, ethnic or religious persecution. This list is not exhaustive. We assume
that the gravity of persecution is exogenous.
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exogenous in that they cannot be influenced by state policy. α includes all reasons for finding
a country attractive, with the exception of national asylum law: for example, the presence
of family, the language, or the distance of jurisdiction 2 relatively to jurisdiction 1 to border
of the area. The latter factor relates to the Dublin II supranational regulation which implies
that the closer the destination country to the border of the area, the greater the chances of
the country being responsible for the asylum application, and the more popular this country
is for asylum applications. Note that refugees can apply for asylum only once in the European
Union.15
If the standard is lower - i.e. stricter - in jurisdiction 2 compared to jurisdiction 1 - x2 < x1
-, the number of asylum applications e1(x1) in jurisdiction 1 is given by x1 − (1− α)x2.
This number is defined by the share of those who have the choice of both jurisdictions
(αx2), plus those who can only apply for asylum in jurisdiction 1: (x1 − x2). This setup
assumes that, given the choice between an exogenously preferred country and a country in
which a protection status can be obtained, a refugee would opt for the latter.
2.2 The maximization problem of the jurisdictions
To set a standard xi, each jurisdiction faces a tradeoff between its benefits and its costs.
We assume that both jurisdictions have the same benefit function b(xi) that depends on the
announced standard. However, their cost function c(.) depends on the effective number of
eligible applicants.16
2.2.1 The benefit function
The benefit function b(xi) is assumed to be the same in all the jurisdictions for a same
announced standard of asylum law. An increase in the standard (i) diminishes enforcement
costs and (ii) raises the “moral” benefits derived from the valuation of the protection of
a large number of refugees. The costs of enforcing the standard are due to the fact that
15There are exceptions to this rule, but they concern a negligible number of refugees.
16Assuming differing benefit functions would complicate the model without adding to the results, since the
net benefit, i.e. benefit minus cost, is already differentiated.
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some refugees will be refused, or prevented from accessing the territory. The higher the
announced standard, the less this is the case, and the lower will be the costs of implementing
the standard.
Parliamentary debates show the valuation of the protection of refugees. Adopting a
generous and humanitarian standard is an objective that is particularly emphasized. There
are thus benefits derived from having higher standards, as very low standards harm the
reputation of the country.17 The benefits increase with the announced standard: the higher
the standard, the better the humanitarian reputation of the country. Benefits here depend
on the standard, rather than on the actual numbers of refugees entering the country, because
the reputation of a country depends on the treatment that it gives to refugees, rather than
on the number of refugees that it hosts.
The benefit function b(xi) is strictly concave for all x ∈ [0, 1]. We further assume that
the benefits vary from −∞ at an extremely strict standard (close to 0) to a positive upper
limit B, such that:
lim
x→0
b(x) = −∞
lim
x→1
b(x) = B
The minimum legal standard is called x0, which is such that b(x0) = 0
18. The jurisdictions
have a positive benefit along the interval [x0, 1].
2.2.2 The hosting cost function
Hosting refugees implies a cost that depends on the number of eligible refugees. The cost
functions are the same for both countries c(.). However, the actual costs depend on the
number of asylum claims, which in turn depend on the preference factors, respectiveley α
and (1 − α). c(x) increases in x and is convex: c′(x) > 0, c′′(x) > 0, with c(0) = 0 and
limx→1 c(.) = +∞. We further assume that the first derivative of c is homogeneous of degree
17See also the analysis of asylum law as a public good by Barbou des Places and Deffains (2004).
18bc(.) is strictly increasing over [0, 1]. However, the lower limit is negative and the higher limit is positive
(B > 0). We will see that there therefore exists an x0 such that b(x0) = c(x0) and x0 < 1.
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one.19
Economic effects of illegal immigration are not included in the payoff function of each
jurisdiction, as there is no consensus about the economic effects of illegal immigration in the
litterature. OECD (1999) suggest that the macro economic effect of illegal immigration may
be positive. We abstain from taking a position on this issue and limit the analysis to pure
asylum considerations. Indeed, according to Hanson (2007), the net impact on both legal
and illegal immigration on US economy is small.
2.3 The optimal level of the asylum law standards of the jurisdic-
tions
The asylum law standards are assumed to be chosen independently by each jurisdiction.
The benefits function b(xi) depends on the standard xi of asylum law announced by the
government, while the hosting costs are not directly function of the standard, but of the
effective number of refugees ei which in turns depends on x1 and x2. The level of utility
that a jurisdiction derives from a level of standard is equivalent to the benefits net of the
implementation and hosting costs.
2.3.1 The benchmark case: Refugee destination is chosen independently of eli-
gibility
Assume first that refugees, when immigrating, do not choose their destination country accord-
ing to where they are eligible for a protection status. Rather, they choose their destination
country according to their other preferences and apply for asylum if they happen to fulfil the
criteria. Therefore, the effective number of asylum applications in jurisdiction 1 depends only
on its own standard. Consequently, jurisdiction 1 chooses a standard x∗1 which maximizes
the following problem:
max
x1
b(x1)− c[e1(x1)]
19These assumptions are analogous to those made in Bubb, Kramer and Levine (2008).
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with e1(x1) = αx1. The optimal standard x
∗
1 is implicitly defined
20 by (1):
b′(x∗1) = αc
′[e1(x∗1)] (1)
Similarly, jurisdiction 2 chooses the optimal standard x∗2 defined
21 by:
b′(x∗2) = (1− α)c′[e2(x∗2)]
with e2(x2) = (1− α)x2.
Given that the marginal hosting costs of jurisdiction 1 are lower than those of jurisdiction
2 due to the greater preference for country 2, the optimal standard x∗2 of jurisdiction 2 is
inferior to that of jurisdiction 1, x∗1.
22
2.3.2 Externality case: Refugee destination choice is made according to their
eligibility
Assume now that refugees always prefer to go to the jurisdiction where they are eligible, and
that refugees are allowed to apply for asylum in any jurisdiction as illustrated in figure 1.
The two jurisdictions simultaneously choose the level of the standard. They have complete
information. Each jurisdiction must solve the following optimization problem:
max
xi
b(xi)− c[ei(xi, x˜j)] with i, j{1, 2}
20The second order condition is respected, since b′′(x) < 0 and c′′[x] > 0 ∀ x  [0, 1] :
b′′(x1)− α2c′′[αx] < 0.
21Similarly, the second order condition is respected.
22Indeed, suppose that x1 = x2, then
b′(x1) = b′(x2)
However, α < 12 and therefore e
′
1(x1)c
′[e1(x1)] < e′2(x1)c
′[e1(x1)]. Necessarily, since b′′(.) < 0, we have :
x∗2 < x
∗
1.
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with
e1(x1, x2) =
 x1 − (1− α)x2 if x1 > x2αx1 if x1 6 x2
e2(x1, x2) =
 x2 − αx1 if x2 > x1(1− α)x2 if x2 6 x1
The response function of jurisdiction i to j is such that:
x˜i(xj) =
 x˜i(xj) if xi > xjxi if xi 6 xj
We denote x˜i(xj) the standard which maximizes the objective function of jurisdiction i if
the other jurisdiction chooses xj.
Both jurisdictions adopt a standard x˜i(x
∗
j) stricter than x
∗
i when xi > xj. Therefore, the
best response functions are such that :
x˜1(x
∗
2) =
 x˜1(x∗2) if x1 > x∗2x∗1 if x1 6 x∗2 and x˜2(x∗1) =
 x˜2(x∗1) if x2 > x∗1x∗2 if x2 6 x∗1
We show that there is an externality effect: the choice of a standard by jurisdiction j
such that xi > xj has a positive impact on the objective function of jurisdiction i, not party
to a given economic transaction.
dx˜i(xj)
dxj
=
 > 0 if xi > xj0 if xi 6 xj (2)
Lemma 1: The standard chosen by jurisdiction 1 remains less strict than the standard
chosen by jurisdiction 2: x˜2(x1) = x
∗
2 and x
∗
2 < x˜1(x
∗
2) < x
∗
1. The payoff of jurisdiction 2 is
not altered.
Proof. See appendix (A.1) 
The choice of standard by jurisdiction 1 now depends on jurisdiction 2’s standard. An
increase in the difference x1− x2 imposes an additional cost on jurisdiction 1 in terms of the
11
externality. Therefore, jurisdiction 1’s standard is reduced relative to its optimum without
externalities x∗1. This is the “race to the bottom” effect (towards a stricter standard). By
adding both payoff functions, we can easily see that the total payoff of the zone is lower than
without the externality effect.
3 Harmonization
We now analyze the efficiency of fixed and minimum standard harmonization regimes. In
other words, we examine a centralized versus a partly decentralized regime. Before going
through this analysis, we justify it by a comparison with the Pareto efficient situation.
3.1 Pareto efficient situation
An omniscient and benevolent centralized law maker chooses a Pareto efficient solution with
two fixed standards x∗∗1 and x
∗∗
2 by maximizing the payoff of the zone containing the two
jurisdictions:
max
x1,x2
b(x1)− c[e1(x1, x2)] + b(x2)− c[e2(x1, x2)]
The implicit conditions defining x∗∗1 and x
∗∗
2 are:
b′(x1)− c′[e1(x1, x2)] = 0 (3)
b′(x2) + (1− α)c′[e1(x1, x2)]− (1− α)c′[e2(x1, x2)] = 0 (4)
Lemma 2: An omniscient producer of law would apply higher standards than the jurisdic-
tions.
x˜1(x
∗
2), x
∗
2 < x
∗∗
1 , x
∗∗
2
Proof. See appendix (A.2) 
Jurisdiction 2 is here forced to partially bear the cost of the externality (x∗2 < x
∗∗
2 ), as
an increase in x2 allows jurisdiction 1 to raise its standard. These differences between the
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standards chosen by the benevolent law maker and independently by the jurisdictions justify
the intervention of a central law maker.
However, an EU law maker cannot directly impose different standards x∗∗1 and x
∗∗
2 due to
the principle of anonymity which states that a reform should apply to all members (article
12, Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community). Rather,
a common rule needs to be found for both countries. In what follows, two regimes are
considered: a fixed and a minimum standard regime.
3.2 Fixed standard
We assume that the benevolent central law maker23 has perfect knowledge of the maximiza-
tion problems of the jurisdictions. He produces a common standard x¯ as depicted in figure 2
such that x1 = x2 = x¯ by maximizing the welfare of the zone:
2b(x)− c[e1(x1, x2)]− c[e2(x1, x2)] (5)
In this case, there is no externality. Standard x¯ is implicitly defined by its first order condition:
2b′(x¯)− αc′[e1(x¯)]− (1− α)c′[e2(x¯)] = 0 (6)
Lemma 3: The fixed harmonized standard is situated at a level between the optimum stan-
dards of the jurisdictions without externalities: x¯ ]x∗2, x
∗
1[.
Proof. See appendix (A.3) 
Figure 2 illustrates the result.
The relation between x¯ and x˜1 cannot be generally determined. The sign of x¯−x˜1 depends
on the values of α. The standard x¯ is implicitly defined by the average marginal costs of the
two jurisdictions.
23We assume that the central law maker weighs the welfare of each jurisdiction equally. Different weights
would only slightly change the results and would not have any impact on the conclusions.
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If the differences between the jurisdictions are small (α is close to 1
2
), then the standards
chosen by 1 and 2 are close to each other, and the externality imposes only a small cost on 1.
On the other hand, if the marginal costs are very different, the externality has a large effect.
3.3 Minimum standard
We will now focus on an intermediary solution: the production of minimum standards which
each jurisdiction is free to exceed. Consider a sequential game in two steps. The central law
maker decides on a minimum standard xm such that xi > xm (i = 1, 2). Each jurisdiction
then chooses its standard as a function of xm. We reason by backward induction.
3.3.1 The choice of the jurisdictions
As before, the two jurisdictions have complete information. Jurisdiction 1 anticipates that
jurisdiction 2 will not choose a standard other than xm
24. It chooses a standard x˜1(xm) that
maximizes the following function:
b(x1)− c[e1(x1, x2)]
The implicit functions theorem shows that at the optimum:
dx˜1(xm)
dxm
= − (1− α)c
′′[e1(x˜1, xm)]
b′′(x˜1)− c′′[e1(x˜1, xm)] > 0. (7)
The higher the minimum standard, the higher the optimal standard of jurisdiction 1. A
“race to the top” effect is characterized by the positive variation of x1 when the minimum
standard increases. One can show that this variation is inferior to (1− α):
dx˜1
dxm
(x˜1, xm) < 1− α (8)
3.3.2 The central law maker
The central law maker chooses xm to maximize the sum of both jurisdictions’ objective
functions:
24For xm > x∗2, the reasoning is the same as in proof A.1.
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max
xm
b(xm) + b[x˜1(xm)]− c[e2(xm)]− c[e1(x˜1, xm)] (9)
The first order condition defining x˜m is:
b′(xm) +
∂x1
∂xm
b[x˜1(xm)]− (1− α)c′[e2(xm)]− [ ∂x1
∂xm
− (1− α)]c′[e1(x˜1, xm)] = 0
Proposition 1: The minimum standard xm is higher than the optimal standard x
∗
2 without
externalities of jurisdiction 2. The standard x˜1(xm) that maximizes the objective function of
jurisdiction 1 is higher than the minimum standard, but it is lower than the optimal standard
in the absence of externalities: x∗2 < xm < x˜1(xm) < x
∗
1.
Proof. See appendix (A.4) 
Figure 3 illustrates the result.
We have shown that x˜1(x˜m)  ]x˜m, x
∗
1[. Jurisdiction 1 adopts a standard that exceeds the
minimum standard. This leads to a “race to the top” that is limited in that it does not lead
to a standard of the level that it would have adopted in the absence of externalities.
3.4 Comparison of harmonization regimes
In order to estimate the desirability of the different modes of harmonization, two criteria are
considered: the welfare of the jurisdictions and the welfare of the refugees.
3.4.1 The welfare of the jurisdictions
We define a country’s welfare W (xi, xj) as its benefits minus its costs.
3.4.1.1 Fixed harmonized standards versus no harmonization
The welfare of jurisdiction 2 is always reduced by fixed standard harmonization. Indeed,
we know from Lemma 3 that x¯ > x∗2. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion tells us that fixed stan-
dard harmonization regimes should be applied if and only if the increase in the welfare of
jurisdiction 1 could compensate the decrease in the payoff of jurisdiction 2. We show that:
15
Lemma 4: There exists a threshold x¯min  ]x
∗
2, x˜1[ below which jurisdiction 1’s payoff is
necessarily diminished in a fixed standard harmonization regime as opposed to the absence of
harmonization. Furthermore, a fixed harmonized standard only increases welfare compared
to no harmonization if the externality effect is high, i.e. α is low.
Proof. See appendix (A.5) 
Two cases can now be distinguished. First, if x¯ 6 x¯min, harmonization reduces the social
welfare of both jurisdictions. Second, if x¯ > x¯min, the sign of ∆W = W (x˜1, x
∗
2) −W (x¯, x¯)
depends on the extent of the cost of increasing the standard from x∗2 to x¯ for jurisdiction
225 relative to the increase in the welfare of jurisdiction 2. Only if the externality effect in
the competition framework is too high can strict harmonization be socially preferable. If
the standard of the central law maker is sufficiently low (x¯ 6 x¯min), then the welfare of each
jurisdiction under harmonization is lower than in the absence of harmonization. On the other
hand, if the standard defined by the central law maker is higher than the threshold value, then
it is possible that social welfare is increased. This is the case only when the variation of the
welfare of jurisdiction 1 exceeds the reduction of welfare for jurisdiction 2. The intervention
of the central law maker thus has a redistributive effect. There is a tradeoff between the
externality and the inefficiencies linked to a common standard when cost functions differ.
3.4.1.2 Minimum harmonized standards versus no harmonization
The following three cases are possible:
W (x˜1, xm) Q W (x˜1, x∗2)
Lemma 5: Minimum standards increase the welfare in the less preferred jurisdiction 1, and
decrease welfare for the jurisdiction with higher the refugee inflow.
Minimum standards can only lead to an overall improvement in welfare if the losses for 2
are outweighed by the gains for 1.
25b(x∗2)− c(x∗2)− [b(x¯)− c(x¯)] < 0 because x¯ > x∗2.
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3.4.1.3 Minimum standard versus fixed harmonized standards
In order to compare the welfare under a fixed standard and a minimum standard, suppose
that x¯ = xm. In this case, the social welfare with a minimum standard is superior to a fixed
standard.
W (x¯, x¯) < W (x˜1, x¯)
The difference in terms of welfare can be written as:
b(x¯)− c[e1(x¯)]− {b(x˜1(x¯))− c[e1(x˜1, x¯)]} < 0
This difference is negative because x˜1 is per definition the maximum value of the function
b(x)− c[e1(x˜1, x¯)].
These results are summarized in a series of remarks.
Remark 1: Even with minimum standards, harmonization does not always increase social
welfare.
Remark 2: Jurisdiction 1’s welfare is always increased by minimum standards, as opposed
to fixed standards, because minimum standards give it discretion to adopt its standard. Ju-
risdiction 2’s welfare is always diminished by harmonization. There thus exists a tradeoff
between the increase of costs for jurisdiction 2 and the decrease of costs for jurisdiction 1.
Remark 3: Contrary to the fixed standard regime, a minimum standard regime ends up
partly decentralizing to jurisdiction 1 the tradeoff between the inefficiencies linked to the sin-
gle standard and the cost of the externalities. Jurisdiction 1 can determine the amount of
externality which it is prepared to bear.
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3.4.2 The standard of refugee protection
We assume that refugees always prefer to go to the jurisdiction where they are eligible.
Therefore, their welfare is determined by the highest standard in the region, i.e. the standard
in jurisdiction 1.
Jurisdiction 1 Jurisdiction 2 Maximum
Benchmark x∗1 x
∗
2 x
∗
1
Externality x˜1(x
∗
2) x
∗
2 x˜1(x
∗
2)
Minimum standard x˜1(xm) xm x˜1(xm)
Minimum standard with xm = x¯ x˜1(x¯) x¯ x˜1(x¯)
Table 1: Optimal standards under different modes of law making
It follows from the preceding results that no standard meets the standard x∗1 set by juris-
diction 1 without externality. However, under the hypothesis that there exists an externality
effect, jurisdiction 1 lowers its standard to x˜1(x
∗
2). The share of refugees eligible to refugee
protection is always highest in a system of minimum standards:
x˜1(xm) > x˜1(x
∗
2)
Remark 4: From the point of view of the refugees, the best mode of law making is harmo-
nization with minimum standards. Harmonization with a fixed standard is not beneficial to
the refugees. Therefore, a minimum standard as opposed to a fixed standard is preferred both
by refugees and the two jurisdictions.
If only a proportion of refugee decides to opt for the jurisdiction where they are eligible,
the externality effect will be smaller. As long as some refugees obey this rule, the externality
exists and the analysis remains relevant.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Main results
The comparison with the Pareto efficient situation of total discretion of, or competition
between, jurisdictions, shows that standards chosen independently by the two jurisdictions
faced with heterogeneous refugee inflows (preferences) are lower than standards chosen by
an omniscient and benevolent producer of law. In particular, the jurisdiction closest to the
external border independently chooses stricter criteria, since it does not take the externality
effect on the other jurisdiction’s net benefit into account. This process is called a “race to
the bottom”, and it justifies the question of the intervention of a central law maker.
The intervention of a central lawmaker can be made through the imposition of a fixed or
a flexible standard. The effect of harmonization is opposite on both jurisdictions: compared
to competition, it can increase the social welfare of the country closer to the center, but it
diminishes the social welfare of the jurisdiction facing higher refugee inflow, be it because
of refugee preferences or because of its geographical situation. Harmonization is thus not a
solution to relieve countries suffering from extra proportional refugee inflow. On the contrary,
these countries lose from harmonization.
To partially decentralize the production of law through a minimum standard makes it
possible to increase the jurisdictions’ welfare in comparison to the fixed standard. A minimum
standard decreases the welfare of the peripheral jurisdiction, but it gives the other jurisdiction
the possibility of adopting a higher - i.e. a less strict - standard if this increases its welfare.
The decision is partly decentralized: the central jurisdiction prefers to suffer a certain degree
of externality in order to optimize its social welfare. Its choice of standard is left to its own
discretion. However, its benefits from the harmonization do not always outweigh the losses
of the peripheral jurisdiction.
The result from the point of view of refugees is that a flexible standard is always better
for the population of refugees, as it leaves a margin to increase the highest standard. By
increasing the standard, flexible asylum law harmonization has redistributive effects that can
be assimilated to a “race to the top”.
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4.2 Application
4.2.1 Numerical example
The discussion here proceeds by reference to a numerical example, which serves to illustrate
in a straightforward manner the interactions generated by the competing standards in a “free
movement” zone, such as Schengen zone, and to get a clearer idea of the consequences for
the countries and refugees of different regimes. Assume there are two countries in this zone,
each of them with the following benefit function b(x) and cost function c(x):
b(x) = 1 + a ln(x)
c(x) = x2
Assume that 100, 000 refugees apply for asylum status in the zone. They can be ranked
according to their situation, and the persecution they have endured (uniform distribution on
0 to 100.000). The preferences of the refugees about the destination are such that if both
countries choose the same standard, one quarter26 of the refugees opt for jurisdiction 1, and
the other for jurisdiction 2. Jurisdiction 2 is thus clearly preferred by refugees for reasons
not linked to asylum law, i.e. language, family links or peripheral situation. We assume that
a = 1
15
.
Tables 2-4 summarize the results:
Jurisdiction 1 Jurisdiction 2 Max
Benchmark 0.7303 0.2434 0.7303
Externality 0.2954 0.2232 0.2954
Pareto efficiency 0.3373 0.3180 0.3373
Fixed standard x¯ 0.3265 0.3265 0.3265
Minimum standard with xm = x¯ 0.3423 0.3265 0.3423
Table 2: Standards under different modes of law making, numerical example
26α = 14 .
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No. of accepted asylum seekers Jurisdiction 1 Jurisdiction 2 Sum
Benchmark 18 18 36
Externality 11 18 29
Pareto efficiency 10 24 34
Fixed standard x¯ 8 24 32
Minimum standard with xm = x¯ 10 24 34
Table 3: Number of asylum seekers in thousands under different modes of law making,
numerical example
Welfare Jurisdiction 1 Jurisdiction 2 Sum
Benchmark 0.9457 0.8725 1.8182
Externality 0.9060 0.8725 1.7784
Pareto efficiency 0.9178 1.0043 1.9221
Fixed standard x¯ 0.9187 0.8654 1.7841
Minimum standard with xm = x¯ 0.9190 0.8654 1.7844
Table 4: Jurisdictions’ welfare under different modes of law making, numerical example
Table 2 illustrates the race to the bottom of asylum standards: it shows that compared
to the benchmark without externalities, jurisdiction 1 reduces its standard from 0.73 to 0.29
when the externality is taken into account. The effect is also existent, but much smaller, for
jurisdiction 2, the preferred destination of three quarters of the refugees, which has a higher
standard of proof in the competition context: it reduces its standard from 0.24 to 0.22. The
minimum standard regime leads to the most lenient standard compared to no harmonization
and the fixed standard regime, at 0.34 in jurisdiction 1. However, the standards in both
countries are higher than those required for Pareto efficiency.
Comparing the outcomes of the fixed and the minimum standard regimes with no har-
monization, the number of refugees who obtain the asylum status is the highest under the
minimum standard solution at around 34,000 (see Table 3). However, note that the fixed
standard leads to the protection of a higher number of refugees than when there is no har-
monization. Jurisdiction 2 carries the cost of this result: under fixed standards, jurisdiction
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1 reduces its intake of asylum seekers from 11,000 to 8,000, while jurisdiction 2 increases its
numbers from 18,000 to 24,000.
The welfare of the zone is increased in the presence of harmonization, though it remains
below the Pareto efficient level (see Table 4). Jurisdiction 2 loses from harmonization, while
jurisdiction 1 gains by comparison with the regulatory competition case. This gain is highest
in the case of the minimum standard regime. In both cases, jurisdiction 1’s gains exceed
jurisdiction 2’s losses. Compensation is thus possible. The minimum standard solution
appears to be best both for the host country zone (assuming there is compensation for
jurisdiction 2) and for the refugees.
4.2.2 Asylum lawmaking in Europe
One can apply the results of our model to asylum law making in the European Union,
where the number of asylum applications increased considerably in the early 1990s. From
the early 1980s to 1992, asylum applications in Europe increased sevenfold from around
100,000 per year to 700,000. Latest figures put the number of pending asylum applications
in Europe at 273,000 (UNHCR 2009). Member countries reacted by considerably tightening
their policies. For example, Germany changed its constitution in 1993 in order to apply
restrictive laws to asylum seekers. Border controls were toughened, living conditions for
asylum seekers downgraded, expulsions encouraged, and reforms of procedures restricted
access to the refugee status (Hatton 2004).
In our model, this “race to the bottom” of asylum laws is explained by the externality
effect: if one country introduces restrictive policies, it will create an externality on other
countries, which will experience a disproportional rise in the number of asylum applications,
and of the corresponding costs. In a dynamic setting, they will follow suit and also decrease
the generosity of their asylum legislation. This Cournot competition can be avoided by
appointing a central lawmaker.
The European Union followed the development described in the model. Since the opening
of the borders within the EU27, asylum policies are being gradually transferred to the EU
27This process was decided on in the European Single Act in 1986 and realised in 1992.
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level. This development started with an intergovernmental approach in the 1980s, followed
by a move toward the supranational level in the 1990s. The so-called “Dublin Treaty”,
followed by the Dublin II regulation in 2002, was drafted to determine which member state
is responsible for an asylum application. In the absence of other criteria, it is the country
first entered by the refugee which must process the asylum application. This puts a lot of
pressure on peripheral EU member countries.
With the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) the Schengen Agreement was integrated into the
European Union. During the 5-year transition period, ending in April 2004, the Commission
adopted measures defining the member state responsible for examining an asylum claim.
These directives are minimum standards of asylum law and not fixed rules, in that they
allow member countries to adopt higher standards. According to the European Union Council
Directive 2004/83/EC, “Member States may introduce or retain more favorable standards
for determining who qualifies as a refugee (...)” (Article 3). The qualification for being a
refugee is that “acts of persecution (...) must be sufficiently serious” (Article 9). Both the
use of such general terms and the written possibility to adopt more favourable standards
leave room for discretion to Member States.
Our model shows that this flexibility of interpretation of European Community law is
wanted rather than suffered. We have seen that the minimum standards allow the central
lawmaker to enforce a threshold standard. It forces the lower standard jurisdiction to take
into account the externality 28, while leaving it to the discretion of the member countries to set
higher standards to optimize their specific welfare. Refugee welfare is enhanced compared to
totally decentralized law making: the lowest standards are higher than before, so the countries
with the highest standards, which suffer less externalities, also adopt higher standards. Under
these circumstances, a greater proportion of refugees can hope for protection. However, the
peripheral EU member countries, which already face high costs from asylum applications,
would be further disadvantaged by EU harmonization. Harmonization is indeed no tool for
28Indeed, one of the main objectives explicitly mentioned in this directive is to “limit the secondary
movements of applicants for asylum between Members States” by defining common minimum standards to
qualify as a refugee (point 7), Council Directive 2004/83/EC.
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redistribution among member states in favor of the countries facing higher costs.
The next step envisaged in order to complete the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS) is the gradual introduction of a “common asylum procedure and a uniform status
valid throughout the EU” and to “ensure a higher degree of solidarity between EU Member
States”29. It is to be feared that the benefits of the minimum standards will be destroyed
in the process of further harmonization. Indeed, our model shows that fixed standards
are less favourable to member countries than minimum standards. Although they eliminate
externalities, fixed standards do not take the specificities of host countries into account. They
present a compromise, rather than a maximisation, of their welfare. Correspondingly, there
exists no country with higher standards which can protect a larger share of refugees. Both
member countries and refugees will suffer adverse consequences of fixed standards. Also, we
show that fixed common standards do not lead to greater solidarity among Member States,
but instead increase costs for the states that already experience the highest refugee flows.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that European asylum law harmonization, whether with
minimum or with fixed standards, is of benefit to the member states - the redistribution that
it involves may well leave all worse off. Only refugees are to gain, and only from well-enforced
minimum standards. It is therefore not clear that the subsidiarity principle of the European
Union is respected, i.e. that Member States might not be better off regulating asylum in an
entirely decentralized manner.
5 Final remarks
Previous literature has examined the competition between jurisdictions in the presence of
externalities in many legal areas, and the choice between harmonization and competition.
In this paper we introduce the possibility of adopting a more flexible legal framework to
asylum law. Our analysis highlights the importance of minimum standards when dealing with
harmonization. Beyond the specificities of the case of asylum law making, these legal solutions
can indeed be applied to many harmonization cases, such as environmental or financial service
29European Commission 2007.
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industry regulations. In this context, flexible law consists of giving a margin of discretion to
jurisdictions. It enables them to partly adapt their regulation to their own characteristics.
Consequently, the harmonization process is less “costly” (i.e. less inefficient), as long as the
minimum standards are respected. However, this comes at a price for the peripheral EU
countries. In the European context, we effectively observe many cases where the guidelines
by the Commission are very general30, allowing each country to further define it. The major
benefit of flexible law is that it takes into account the heterogeneity of jurisdictions.
We conclude with some thoughts on how our results might be extended if we drop the
hypothesis of the benevolence of the producer of law. Frey and Eichenberger (1996) highlight
the sensitivity of a central lawmaker to lobbies. Also, Roe (2003, 2005) in a public choice
perspective, emphasizes the role of interest groups in corporate law making. The flexibility
of legal rules may limit the influence of lobbies by giving more discretion to jurisdictions
(Landes and Posner, 1975, Sanchirico and Mahoney, 2005). The relative bargaining power of
the member countries in the centralized institution could alter the game and thus influence
the standard set by the central lawmaker. The locus of the asylum law making decision
among the central institutions affects the preferences of the central lawmaker.31 Another
interesting extension to our model would be the inclusion of an enforcement mechanism of
the centralized standard, as well as a compensation mechanism between countries.
30See for example the Lamfalussy process in the financial service industry regulation.
31See Monheim (2007).
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6 Extension: the central lawmaker cares about “inte-
gration”
We now assume that the central lawmaker cares about “integration”. Integration is defined
here as the number of asylum seekers in both jurisdictions. The welfare function of the
central lawmaker can be rewritten as :
W (x1, x2) = γ[e1(x1, x2) + e2(x1, x2)] + b(x1) + b(x2)− c(e1(x1, x2))− c(e2(x1, x2))
with γ a coefficient which represents the preference of the central lawmaker for integration.
The numbers of accepted refugee in jurisdiction 1 e1(x1, x2) and in jurisdiction 2 e2(x1, x2)
are defined as before:
e1(x1, x2) =
 x1 − (1− α)x2 if x1 > x2αx1 if x1 6 x2
e2(x1, x2) =
 x2 − αx1 if x2 > x1(1− α)x2 if x2 6 x1
6.1 Fixed standard:
We assume that the benevolent central lawmaker produces a common standard x˘ such that
x1 = x2 = x¯ by maximizing:
W (x, x) = γ[e1(x, x) + e2(x, x)] + 2b(x)− c(e2(x, x))− c(e1(x, x))
The first order condition for x˘ is:
γ + 2b′(x˘)− αc′[e1(x˘, x˘)]− (1− α)c′[e2(x˘, x˘)] = 0
For x = x¯, we have γ + 2b′(x)− αc′(e1(x))− (1− α)c′(e2(x)) > 0 if γ > 0. Thus, x˘ > x¯.
The implicit functions theorem shows that:
dx˘
dγ
> 0
The higher the preference for integration, the higher the common standard x˘.
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6.2 Minimum standard:
The central lawmaker chooses x˘m that maximizes the sum of both jurisdictions’ objective
functions32, plus the utility derived from integration:
W (x1, x2) = γ[e1(x˜1, xm) + e2(x˜1, xm)] + b(xm) + b[x˜1(xm)]− c[e2(xm)]− c[e1(x˜1, xm)]
The first order condition defining x˘m is :
γ
∂x1
∂xm
+ b′(x˘m) +
∂x1
∂xm
b′[x˜1(x˘m)]− (1− α)c′[e2(x˘m)]− [ ∂x1
∂xm
− (1− α)]c′[e1(x˜1, x˘m)] = 0
For x˘m = xm, we have γ
∂x1
∂xm
+ b′(xm) + ∂x1∂xm b
′[x˜1(xm)] − (1 − α)c′[e2(xm)] − [ ∂x1∂xm − (1 −
α)]c′[e1(x˜1, xm)] > 0 if γ > 033. Thus, x˘m > xm.
The implicit functions theorem shows that:
dx˘m
dγ
> 0
The higher the preference for integration, the higher the minimum standard x˘m.
6.3 Comparison of common and minimum standard
Let us assume that the new minimum standard is equal to the new common fixed standard:
xm = x˘. Then x˜1(x˘) > x˘, since we have shown that
dx˜1(xm)
dxm
= − (1− α)c
′′[e1(x˜1, xm)]
b′′(x˜1)− c′′[e1(x˜1, xm)] > 0
Therefore, including an assumption about integration, here a weighting of the number
of asylum seekers, does not change the ranking of the results, but increase the level of the
standard, as the central lawmaker put more weight on the welfare of refugees (understood
here as the number of refugee accepted).
32As before, jurisdiction 1 chooses x˜1(xm) higher than xm, while jurisdiction 2 chooses the minimum
standard xm. See section 3.3.
33As ∂x1∂xm > 0. See section 3.3.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Let us show that x˜1 > x
∗
2. We will proceed by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that:
x˜1 < x
∗
2
The first order condition for x˜1 is:
b′(x˜1) = αc′(αx˜1) (10)
The first order condition for x∗2 is:
b′(x∗2) = c
′(x∗2 − αx˜1) (11)
We know from the specification of the b function that if x˜1 < x
∗
2, then
b′(x∗2) < b
′(x˜1)
Consequently,
c′(x∗2 − αx˜1) < αc′(αx˜1) (12)
However, (12) is impossible, because x∗2 − αx˜1 > α2x˜1 for α < 12 . We necessarily have
c′(x∗2 − αx˜1) > αc′(αx˜1) and x˜1(x∗2) > x∗2.
Suppose that x˜1 = x
∗
2. Then the first order condition for jurisdiction 1 is unchanged,
jurisdiction 2 suffers no externality and x∗2 is implicitly defined by:
b′(x∗2) = (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗2]
We know that if x˜1 = x
∗
2, then b
′(x˜1) = b′(x∗2). Thus:
αc′(αx∗2) = (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗2]
or,
c′(α2x∗2) = c
′[(1− α)2x∗2] (13)
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However, we have α < 1
2
, and thus α2x∗2 < (1− α)2x∗2. It is thus impossible that x˜1 = x∗2.
We thus know that,
x˜1(x
∗
2) > x
∗
2 
(ii) Let us show that x˜1(x
∗
2) < x
∗
1. Remember that x
∗
1 is implicitly defined by the first
order condition:
b′(x∗1) = αc
′(αx∗1)
x˜1 is implicitly defined by the first order condition:
b′(x˜1) = c′[x˜1 − (1− α)x∗2] (14)
We will proceed by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that x˜1 = x
∗
1. Then b
′(x∗1) = b
′(x˜1).
However,
αc′(αx∗1) < c
′[x˜1 − (1− α)x∗2]
and thus b′(x∗1) < b
′(x˜1).
As by assumption b′′(xi) < 0, we have:
x˜1(x
∗
2) < x
∗
1 
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
One can rewrite the implicit conditions using z such that:
b′(x1)− c′[x1 − (1− α)x2] = 0
b′(x2) + (1− α)c′[x1 − (1− α)x2]z − (1− α)c′[(1− α)x2] = 0
If z = 0, then we have the autarkic condition. If z = 1, then we are in the case of the
omniscient regulator. One can show that:
∂x1
∂z
> 0
And
∂x2
∂z
> 0
With
f1(x1, x2) = b
′(x1)− c′[x1 − (1− α)x2]
and
f2(x1, x2, z) = b
′(x2) + (1− α)c′[x1 − (1− α)x2]z − (1− α)c′[(1− α)x2]
From which
∂f1
∂x1
= b′′(x1)− c′′[x1 − (1− α)x2] < 0
∂f1
∂x2
= (1− α)c′′[x1 − (1− α)x2] > 0
∂f2
∂x1
= (1− α)c′′[x1 − (1− α)x2]z > 0
∂f2
∂x2
= b′′(x2) + (1− α)2c′′[x1 − (1− α)x2]z − (1− α)2c′′[(1− α)x2] < 0
∂f1
∂z
= 0
∂f2
∂z
= (1− α)c′[x1 − (1− α)x2] > 0
The implicit functions theorem tells us that the Jacobian matrix
 ∂f1∂x1 ∂f1∂x2
∂f2
∂x1
∂f2
∂x2
 is invert-
ible. Thus there exists a unique solution for ∂x1
∂z
and ∂x2
∂z
defined by:
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(∂x1
∂z
∂x2
∂z
)
= −
 ∂f1∂x1 ∂f1∂x2
∂f2
∂x1
∂f2
∂x2
−1(∂f1∂z
∂f2
∂z
)
(15)
From the Cramer rule: ∂f1∂x1 ∂f1∂x2
∂f2
∂x1
∂f2
∂x2
−1 = 1
∂f1
∂x1
∂f2
∂x2
− ∂f1
∂x2
∂f2
∂x1
 ∂f2∂x2 − ∂f1∂x2
− ∂f2
∂x1
∂f1
∂x1

However, ∂f1
∂z
= 0. We can thus rewrite (15) such that:
(∂x1
∂z
∂x2
∂z
)
=
1
∂f1
∂x1
∂f2
∂x2
− ∂f1
∂x2
∂f2
∂x1
 − ∂f2∂x1 ∂f2∂z
+ ∂f1
∂x1
∂f2
∂z

We know that − ∂f2
∂x1
∂f2
∂z
< 0 and ∂f1
∂x1
∂f2
∂z
< 0. The determinant is negative, because the second
derivative of the the maximization problem is negative in equilibrium. The sign of ∂x1
∂z
and
∂x2
∂z
is thus the negative of the sign of the numerator. We find:
∂x1
∂z
> 0
And,
∂x2
∂z
> 0
Thus,
x˜1(x
∗
2) < x
∗∗
1 (16)
x∗2 < x
∗∗
2 
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Let us show that x∗2 < x¯
The first order condition (6) that implicitly defines x¯ is:
2b′(x¯) = αc′(αx¯) + (1− α)c′[(1− α)x¯]
Suppose that x¯ = x∗2. Then (6) is:
2b′(x∗2) = αc
′(αx∗2) + (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗2]
However,
b′(x∗2) = (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗2]
We obtain the following inequality:
b′(x∗2)− αc′(αx∗2) > 0
Thus,
x∗2 < x¯
(ii) Let us show that x¯ < x∗1. Suppose that x¯ = x
∗
1. Then (6) is:
2b′(x∗1) = αc
′(αx∗1) + (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗1]
However,
b′(x∗1) = αc
′[αx∗1]
We obtain the following inequality:
b′(x∗1)− (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗1)] < 0
Or,
x¯ < x∗1 
32
A.4 Proof of proposition 1
(i) We will show that x˜1(xm) < x
∗
1. We will proceed by a reductio ad absurdum. If x˜1 = x
∗
1,
we have
b′(x∗1) = c
′[x∗1 − (1− α)xm]
However, we know per definition that
b′(x∗1) = αc
′(x∗1)
Or
αc′(x∗1) = c
′[x∗1 − (1− α)xm]
Rearranging, we find that:
αc′(x∗1)− c′[x∗1 − (1− α)xm] < 0 car x∗1 > xm
And thus
x˜1(xm) < x
∗
1 
(ii) Let us show that xm < x˜1(xm).
Suppose that x˜1(xm) = xm. In this case, we can write:
b′(xm) = c′[xm − (1− α)xm]
or,
b′(xm) = αc′(xm)
However,
b′(x∗1) = αc
′(x∗1)
And xm < x
∗
1. Thus
b′(xm)− 1
2
c′(xm) > 0
and
xm < x˜1(xm) 
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(iii) Let us show that xm > x
∗
2.
We proceed by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that xm = x
∗
2:
b′(x∗2) +
∂x1
∂xm
b′[x˜1(x∗2)]− (1−α)c′[(1−α)x∗2]− [
∂x1
∂xm
− (1−α)]c′[x˜1(x∗2)− (1−α)x∗2] = 0 (17)
However,
b′(x∗2) = (1− α)c′[(1− α)x∗2]
Thus, we can write (17):
∂x1
∂xm
b′(x˜1(x∗2))− [
∂x1
∂xm
− (1− α)]c′(x˜1(x∗2)− (1− α)x∗2)] = 0
However, we know from (8) that:
∂x1
∂xm
< (1− α)
Thus:
∂x1
∂xm
b′(x˜1(x∗2))− [
∂x1
∂xm
− (1− α)]c′[x˜1(x∗2)− (1− α)x∗2)] > 0
Thus,
xm > x
∗
2 
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
The threshold x¯min is defined by:
W1(x¯min, x¯min) = W1(x˜1, x
∗
2)
2b(x¯min)− c(αx¯min)− c[(1− α)x¯min] = b(x˜1)− c[x˜1 − (1− α)x∗2] + b(x∗2)− c[(1− α)x∗2]
At x¯min = x˜1, we obtain:
W1(x˜1, x¯min) > W1(x˜1, x
∗
2)
because x∗2 < x¯min.
At x¯min = x
∗
2, we obtain:
W1(x¯min, x
∗
2) < W1(x˜1, x
∗
2)
because x¯min < x˜1. 
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